feat: improve account security

Support TOTP 2fa, allow for changing password, add session management
and account removal.

server/api/account/index.delete.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import * as z from 'zod';
+import {
+    agents,
+    files,
+    models,
+    providers,
+    settings,
+    toolCalls,
+    topics,
+    users,
+} from '~~/drizzle/schema';
+import { auth } from '~~/lib/auth';
+import { db } from '~~/server/lib/db';
+
+/**
+ * Deletes the signed in user's account and everything that belongs to it.
+ *
+ * The app tables only store a plain user id, nothing cascades from the users
+ * table, so every one of them is cleared here. It all happens in one
+ * transaction: either the whole account is gone or nothing changed.
+ *
+ * Objects in file storage are left alone on purpose.
+ */
+export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
+    await protectRoute(event);
+
+    const userId = event.context.user!.id as string;
+
+    const result = await readValidatedBody(event, (body) =>
+        z
+            .object({
+                password: z.string().min(1),
+                // required when two-factor is on: a code from the authenticator
+                // app, or one of the backup codes
+                code: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+                backupCode: z.boolean().optional(),
+            })
+            .safeParse(body),
+    );
+
+    if (!result.success) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 400,
+            message: result.error.issues[0]!.message,
+        });
+    }
+
+    const { password, code, backupCode } = result.data;
+
+    // read from the database, the session can lag behind by a few minutes
+    const account = await db.query.users.findFirst({
+        where: {
+            id: userId,
+        },
+    });
+
+    const twoFactorEnabled = !!account?.twoFactorEnabled;
+
+    if (twoFactorEnabled && code === undefined) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 400,
+            statusMessage: 'Two-factor code required',
+            data: {
+                code: 'TWO_FACTOR_REQUIRED',
+            },
+        });
+    }
+
+    try {
+        await auth.api.verifyPassword({
+            body: {
+                password,
+            },
+            headers: event.headers,
+        });
+
+        if (twoFactorEnabled && backupCode) {
+            await auth.api.verifyBackupCode({
+                body: {
+                    code: code!,
+                },
+                headers: event.headers,
+            });
+        } else if (twoFactorEnabled) {
+            await auth.api.verifyTOTP({
+                body: {
+                    code: code!,
+                },
+                headers: event.headers,
+            });
+        }
+    } catch (error: any) {
+        const errorCode = error?.body?.code as string | undefined;
+
+        if (errorCode === undefined) {
+            console.error('Failed to verify credentials:', error);
+        }
+
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: errorCode === undefined ? 500 : 400,
+            statusMessage: 'Failed to delete account',
+            data: {
+                code: errorCode ?? 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
+            },
+        });
+    }
+
+    await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+        // messages, their parts, generations and attachments cascade from topics
+        await tx.delete(topics).where(eq(topics.userId, userId));
+        await tx.delete(agents).where(eq(agents.userId, userId));
+        await tx.delete(models).where(eq(models.userId, userId));
+        await tx.delete(providers).where(eq(providers.userId, userId));
+        // nothing points a tool call back at its message, so these never cascade
+        await tx.delete(toolCalls).where(eq(toolCalls.userId, userId));
+        // embeddings go with their file
+        await tx.delete(files).where(eq(files.userId, userId));
+        await tx.delete(settings).where(eq(settings.userId, userId));
+
+        // sessions, accounts and two-factor rows cascade from the user
+        await tx.delete(users).where(eq(users.id, userId));
+    });
+
+    // the session is gone, but the browser would keep trusting its cached
+    // copy for a few minutes unless the cookies go too
+    const { authCookies } = await auth.$context;
+
+    for (const cookie of Object.values(authCookies)) {
+        deleteCookie(event, cookie.name, {
+            path: cookie.attributes.path,
+            secure: cookie.attributes.secure,
+            sameSite: cookie.attributes.sameSite,
+            httpOnly: cookie.attributes.httpOnly,
+        });
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true };
+});

server/api/account/password.get.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { db } from '~~/server/lib/db';
+
+/**
+ * Reports when the password was last changed, or null if it is still the one
+ * the account was created with. The credential account row is only written
+ * when the account is created and when its password changes, so its
+ * updatedAt is the time of the last change.
+ */
+export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
+    await protectRoute(event);
+
+    const userId = event.context.user!.id as string;
+
+    const account = await db.query.accounts.findFirst({
+        where: {
+            userId,
+            providerId: 'credential',
+        },
+    });
+
+    if (!account) {
+        return { changedAt: null };
+    }
+
+    // the two timestamps are written a moment apart on sign up
+    const changed = account.updatedAt.getTime() - account.createdAt.getTime() > 1000;
+
+    return { changedAt: changed ? account.updatedAt : null };
+});

server/api/account/password.post.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+import { and, eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import * as z from 'zod';
+import { providers } from '~~/drizzle/schema';
+import { auth } from '~~/lib/auth';
+import { db } from '~~/server/lib/db';
+
+/**
+ * Changes the password and swaps in the provider API keys re-encrypted with
+ * the new password in one go. API keys are encrypted in the browser with a key
+ * derived from the password, so a password change that leaves the old
+ * ciphertexts behind would make every saved key unreadable.
+ */
+export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
+    await protectRoute(event);
+
+    const userId = event.context.user!.id as string;
+
+    const result = await readValidatedBody(event, (body) =>
+        z
+            .object({
+                currentPassword: z.string().min(1),
+                newPassword: z.string().min(8).max(128),
+                providerKeys: z.array(z.object({
+                    id: z.string(),
+                    apiKey: z.string().min(1),
+                })),
+            })
+            .safeParse(body),
+    );
+
+    if (!result.success) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 400,
+            message: result.error.issues[0]!.message,
+        });
+    }
+
+    const { currentPassword, newPassword, providerKeys } = result.data;
+
+    const existing = await db.query.providers.findMany({
+        where: {
+            userId,
+        },
+    });
+
+    const newKeys = new Map(providerKeys.map(p => [p.id, p.apiKey]));
+
+    // Every saved key has to come back re-encrypted, otherwise it would be
+    // stuck encrypted with the old password.
+    const withKey = existing.filter(p => !!p.config.apiKey);
+    const complete = withKey.every(p => newKeys.has(p.id)) && newKeys.size === withKey.length;
+
+    if (!complete) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 409,
+            statusMessage: 'Provider keys out of date',
+            data: {
+                code: 'PROVIDER_KEYS_OUT_OF_DATE',
+            },
+        });
+    }
+
+    let cookies: string[] = [];
+
+    try {
+        // The password change runs inside the transaction so a rejected
+        // password rolls the key updates back.
+        await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+            for (const provider of withKey) {
+                await tx.update(providers)
+                    .set({
+                        config: {
+                            ...provider.config,
+                            apiKey: newKeys.get(provider.id)!,
+                        },
+                    })
+                    .where(and(eq(providers.id, provider.id), eq(providers.userId, userId)));
+            }
+
+            const { headers } = await auth.api.changePassword({
+                body: {
+                    currentPassword,
+                    newPassword,
+                    // other devices still hold an encryption key derived from the
+                    // old password, so they have to sign in again
+                    revokeOtherSessions: true,
+                },
+                headers: event.headers,
+                returnHeaders: true,
+            });
+
+            cookies = headers.getSetCookie();
+        });
+    } catch (error: any) {
+        const code = error?.body?.code as string | undefined;
+
+        if (code === undefined) {
+            console.error('Failed to change password:', error);
+        }
+
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: code === undefined ? 500 : 400,
+            statusMessage: 'Failed to change password',
+            message: error?.body?.message ?? 'Failed to change password',
+            data: {
+                code: code ?? 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
+            },
+        });
+    }
+
+    for (const cookie of cookies) {
+        appendResponseHeader(event, 'set-cookie', cookie);
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true };
+});

server/api/account/sessions/[id].delete.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import { and, eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { sessions } from '~~/drizzle/schema';
+import { auth } from '~~/lib/auth';
+import { db } from '~~/server/lib/db';
+
+export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
+    const sessionData = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: event.headers });
+
+    if (sessionData === null) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 401,
+            statusMessage: 'Unauthorized',
+        });
+    }
+
+    const id = getRouterParam(event, 'id')!;
+
+    // signing out the current device goes through the normal sign out, which
+    // also clears its cookies
+    if (id === sessionData.session.id) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 400,
+            statusMessage: 'Cannot revoke the current session',
+        });
+    }
+
+    const deleted = await db.delete(sessions)
+        .where(and(eq(sessions.id, id), eq(sessions.userId, sessionData.user.id)))
+        .returning({ id: sessions.id });
+
+    if (deleted.length === 0) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 404,
+            statusMessage: 'Not Found',
+            message: 'Session not found',
+        });
+    }
+
+    return { ok: true };
+});

server/api/account/sessions/index.get.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { auth } from '~~/lib/auth';
+import { db } from '~~/server/lib/db';
+
+/**
+ * Lists the signed in devices for the current user. Session tokens are left
+ * out on purpose: the client only ever needs the id to sign a device out.
+ */
+export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
+    const sessionData = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: event.headers });
+
+    if (sessionData === null) {
+        throw createError({
+            statusCode: 401,
+            statusMessage: 'Unauthorized',
+        });
+    }
+
+    const result = await db.query.sessions.findMany({
+        where: {
+            userId: sessionData.user.id,
+            expiresAt: {
+                gt: new Date(),
+            },
+        },
+        orderBy: {
+            updatedAt: 'desc',
+        },
+    });
+
+    return result.map(session => ({
+        id: session.id,
+        createdAt: session.createdAt,
+        updatedAt: session.updatedAt,
+        ipAddress: session.ipAddress,
+        userAgent: session.userAgent,
+        current: session.id === sessionData.session.id,
+    }));
+});